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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate governance has formed the focus of new management system and 
management mentality. Starting from this point of view, the ambition of this study 
is to examine the philosophy and the operations of the companies in the light of 
corporate governance applications and analyse the impact of corporate governance 
on company value. The practices of corporate governance have been generally 
examined specific to the public joint stock company, whose capital is expected to 
be spread over the base. 
Within the scope of the study, the companies which has been publicly traded 
in BIST100 Index and Governance Index within Borsa İstanbul have been selected 
as the sample for period starting from the year 2016 to the year 2018. The 
relationship between corporate governance rating and accounting-based (return on 
equity), market-based (Tobin’s q ratio) and cash-based (company’s cash flow) as 
valuation indicators has been investigated. 
In the analyses, which have been conducted by using panel data analysis, 
the data of the 83 companies, which have been chosen as the sample among the 
BIST companies for the period starting from the year 2016 to the year 2018, have 
been tested with pooled regression (OLS) method and random effects method. 
As the consequence of this study, it has been observed that the corporate 
governance ratings of the companies have a statistically significant no impact on 
company value from the point of view market-based, accounting-based, and cash-
based value criterions. Therefore, it has been arrived at a conclusion that there has 
been no significant governance impact on the company value. 
 
Key words: Corporate Governance, Company Value, Panel Data Analysis, 
Borsa İstanbul, Corporate Governance Index 
 
xi 
 
ÖZET 
 
Yeni yönetim sistem ve anlayışının odak noktasını kurumsal yönetim 
oluşturmaktır. Buradan hareketle, bu çalışmada şirketlerin felsefesini ve 
işleyişlerini kurumsal yönetim ışığında incelemek ve bu kapsamda kurumsal 
yönetim uygulamalarının şirket değeri üzerindeki etkisini incelemek 
amaçlanmaktadır. Kurumsal yönetim uygulamaları genellikle sermayesi tabana 
yayılmış olması beklenen anonim şirket özelinde incelenmiştir.  
Çalışma kapsamında, örneklem olarak 2016-2018 yıllarında Borsa İstanbul 
bünyesindeki BIST100 Endeksi’nde ve Kurumsal Yönetim Endeksi’nde işlem 
gören şirketler yer almıştır. Örneklemde kullanılan şirketlerin kurumsal yönetim 
notu ile şirketlerin muhasebe bazlı, piyasa bazlı ve nakit bazlı değer ölçütleri 
arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. 
Panel veri analizi kullanılarak yapılan analizlerde örneklem olarak seçilen 
83 şirketin 2016 – 2018 dönemi için kullanılan finansal verileri Havuzlanmış 
Regresyon (OLS), Rassal Etkiler (random-effects) yöntemleri ile test edilmiştir. 
Çalışmanın sonucunda, şirketlerin kurumsal yönetim notunun bulunmasının 
Tobin’ in q oranı, özsermaye karlılığı ve nakit akışı üzerinde istatistiksel olarak 
anlamlı bir etkisinin bulunmadığı gözlenmiştir. Dolayısıyla,  kurumsal yönetim 
uygulamalarının şirket değeri üzerinde istatistiksel anlamda önemli bir etkisinin 
bulunmadığı sonucuna erişilmiştir. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Kurumsal Yönetim, Şirket Değeri, Panel Veri Analizi, 
Borsa İstanbul, Kurumsal Yönetim Endeksi 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Globalization and technological developments removed the borders 
between countries and capital movements have started to increase in the world. As 
pointed out in the Joel Bakan’s, law professor of University of British Columbia, 
documentary film The Corporation, “one hundred and fifty years ago, business 
corporation was a relatively insignificant institution. Today it is all-pervasive. Like 
the church, the monarchy and the Communist Party in other times and places, the 
corporation is today’s dominant institutions.” (Mark Achbar, 2003) 
While companies had limited area of freedom in the period when they 
started to exist, companies have great power and effects in socio-economic order. 
The work of WBCSD (WBCSD, 2013) states that the business is a dominant driving 
power of socio-economic impact by generating employment, training employees, 
building physical infrastructures, having access to raw materials, performing a 
technology transferring, doing the requirements by fulfilling tax liabilities, and 
expanding access to services and products, companies have an impact on people’s 
wealth, abilities, opportunities and living standards. When the company has been 
considered as piece of the puzzle in a society, if it has been removed, the picture 
has not been completed. (Mark Achbar, 2003) 
In this study, it has been aimed to examine the philosophy and the operations 
of the business corporations which are came to exist as a regulated way of doing 
business one hundred and fifty years ago and considered as a legal person in these 
times in the light of corporate governance applications. In this context, it has been 
aimed to analyse the impact of corporate governance applications on company 
valuation. The practices of corporate governance have been generally examined 
specific to the joint stock company, whose capital is expected to be spread over the 
base.  
In the first chapter of this study, corporate governance has been tried to 
explain conceptually, in the meantime the impact of practices of corporate 
governance on companies were mentioned. From this point of view, the concept of 
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corporate governance, its definition, the process of occurrence and importance of 
corporate governance has been explained. Furthermore, the theoretical and 
historical development of corporate governance and the corporate governance 
principles have been emphasised. Thereafter, the events which has an impact on 
occurrence and development of corporate governance approach have been outlined. 
In the second chapter of this study, the studies which take part in literature has been 
given a place. Within this scope, corporate governance studies has been mentioned 
at national and international area. In the last chapter of this study, the impact of 
corporate governance grades of the companies which have been publicly traded in 
Borsa İstanbul (İstanbul Stock Exchange) and subject to BIST Corporate 
Governance Index within Borsa İstanbul on share price and on the nature of the 
company value have been examined by using panel data analysis. In this regard, the 
share prices have been compared between the companies do not have a rating score 
and the companies that receive the score in compliance with the regulations of 
Capital Markets Board of Turkey from the rating agencies, which have been 
licenced by Capital Markets Board in Turkey, among the list on BIST-100 Index.  
The comparison level is the performance of the companies with the governance 
score and do not meet these requirements and do not have a governance rating score 
for the last three years. To put in another way, it has been examined whether the 
share performance of the companies that have the corporate governance rating score 
are better than the other companies listed in BIST100 Index for the last three years.  
Considering the literature, the influence of corporate governance 
applications on company value has been examined by looking at daily / monthly 
and yearly share price changes of joint stock companies, which have been traded in 
Borsa İstanbul. While examining the medium term impact of corporate governance 
applications on company value, the market-based, accounting-based and cash-
based indicators which have been used as valuation factors will be enriched my 
study. Analysing the impact of corporate governance, which has been regarded as 
an important indicator of sustainability, on company value will make a scientific 
contribution to the academic works.  
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1. FIRST CHAPTER 
1.1. OVERVIEW: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Corporate governance has been become one of the essential topics in the 
world. 
Corporation is a word which has been originally come from association of 
people who had been approved by the state to carry out some particular function. 
(Mark Achbar, 2003). Noam Chaomsky (2003) states that the civil war and 
industrial revolution companies had achieved a substantial growth with the 
industrial revolution and consequently banking and heavy industry had been arised. 
The corporate lawyers recognized that they have needed more dominance to operate 
and they wanted to remove some of the restrictions that had been placed from a 
historical perspective on the form of corporate. Following the civil war, the 14th 
amendment had been made in order to protect the black people. 
The 14th amendment had been enacted at the end of the American civil war 
with a view to giving the rights to the black people. The amendment empowered 
the rights to black people to own their properties equally and guaranteed that every 
person had the equal protection by the laws. Between the year 1890 and the year 
1910, 307 case files had been brought to the court with regard to 14th Amendment. 
In kind of weird way, 288 of the cases which come to the court had been belonged 
to the corporations. Corporations had claimed that they had been some kind of 
person: legal person. Thus, the Court had accepted the claims of the corporations 
and a legal idea which more commonly referred to as corporate personhood has 
been born: “corporations are people”  
As legal person, corporations are artificial creatures and act with profit 
drive. (Mark Achbar, 2003) 
When looking at the term corporation, the question has been come to mind: 
What kind of a person is the corporation? The corporation have been given the 
rights of immortals. 
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Mark Stuart, former CEO of Shell, states that the businesses required to be 
seen constitutive members of society. But the problem comes in the profit 
motivation.  
When looking at the corporation or company which is under the law a legal 
person following question comes to mind: to whom the companies own loyalty? 
According to Robert Monks, Corporate Governance Advisor from Harvard 
University, corporations have obligation themselves in order to expand and be more 
profitable. By fulfilling this, it has been tendency to be more profitable in a way 
that makes to other people pay the bills for impact of corporations on society. There 
is a statement that has been used by the economists: externalities. While the 
companies has been doing their job, they perform behaviour without a consent from 
the third parties and they want from the other people to deal with problems arising 
as a nature of companies’ work. This approach of the companies brings the 
externalities problem. According to Monks (2003), the corporation is the 
externalizing machine. While the companies achieving the goals, they have not 
aimed a malice. By nature, companies have only serve the purpose of one basic 
thing: to create as much profit as possible in every quarter. This is the impulse of 
capitalism. (Mark Achbar, 2003) 
1.1.1. Concept of Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance can be described as the whole of the mechanisms 
developed in order to harmonize the conflicting interests between all stakeholder 
groups (shareholders and stakeholders). (Arslantaş, 2012) To put it another way, 
corporate governance serves the purpose of reconciliation the rightful interests all 
of stakeholders with the interests of the company and creating the best synthesis 
from this conflict. At this point, corporate governance emphasises that management 
and decision-making processes should be carried out with the cooperation and 
active participation of all stakeholder and managers should act in an agreeable, fair, 
transparent, accountable, effective and responsible approach. (Arslantaş, 2012) 
The 19th century was the period when the entrepreneurs who formed the 
basis of today’s multi-partner companies, and 20th century was the period when the 
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management class left a mark. The 21st century will be the period when corporate 
governance become prominent. (Arslantaş, 2012) 
Elementarily, corporate governance is to enable to the corporations to be 
managed in an open and honest manner. Due to the fact that, all components of 
management has been supposed to form in accordance with this purpose. Corporate 
governance is basically field a work regarding the management of joint stock 
companies and represents the ideal concept of corporate management. (Arslantaş, 
2012) 
Roberts (2001) described the corporation as an imaginary phenomenon 
which has no sensibility and incapable of responsibility and has been immortal 
when compared to person. Considering the people’s tendency to obey the authority 
this circumstance has been taken a different dimension. Intensively obedience to 
corporations’ actions and market dynamics might make the corporations’ ethical 
actors a part of the scandals. (Çakar & Alakavuklar, 2011) 
1.1.2. Purpose of Corporate Governance 
 
The peak trust problem in trade has been occurred at the early stage of the 
21st century. (Mark Achbar, 2003) 
The ideal model of joint stock companies is a partnership whose capital 
spread over the base and engages in large-scale economic activities. In order to 
mention that the partnership is an incorporated, the companies which has been seen 
on the axis of the share concept, has been necessary isolated from the personal 
characteristics and interest of shareholders, executives and those who have a 
decisive influence on the partnership for any reason. (Deloitte, 2007) Looking at 
the companies, it has been seen that lots of joint-stock company are generally 
structured and managed in the direction of senior shareholders’ expectations and 
those priorities. Corporate governance is a conception of eliminating the drawbacks 
of this reality. Desired and preferred structure is that to isolate from the impact of 
the individual interests and initiatives of the shareholders holding a majority of the 
joint-stock companies’ shares and to manage as a mechanism with paying regard to 
legitimate benefits of whole stakeholders. (Deloitte, 2007) 
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The intent of corporate governance has been to prevent from the wrong 
decisions with the profit motivation of the companies and avoid to cause to harm of 
individual or institutional parties which related to companies and regulate this 
process. (Arslantaş, 2012) 
The function of board of directors has been to manage the company in 
compliance with the shareholders' expectations. But the expectations of the 
shareholders has not been only criterion, and also there has been conflict of interests 
of the shareholders. The statutory liability of the board of directors has not been to 
the shareholders, has been accountable to company. As a priority, the board of 
directors has to consider the interest of the company. But, it is not possible to stay 
in the position without looking after shareholders' interests. It is the shareholders 
who has chosen the board of directors. Therefore, the board of directors have to 
meet the expectations of the shareholders. In doing this, they have to look after the 
interests of the company and have to convince the shareholders for the actions 
which has to be taken in the direction of company's interests. (Ararat & Yurtoğlu, 
2012) 
The principle task of the board of directors as the top decision making body 
is to create a continual and permanent company value to the shareholders. Apart 
from all these, the board of directors has been accountable to stakeholders for 
protecting and improving company's reputation in respect of law, codes of conduct 
and commitments. According to Arslantaş and Fındıklı (2010), to exhibit behaviour 
to the stakeholders in the form of goals which have been reached by the companies 
and to care about the rights possessed by the stakeholders has been formed a basis 
of a relationship between the company and stakeholders. 
Corporate governance forms a basis of corporate trust and is of capital 
importance in respect of both managerial and sustainability of access to resource of 
institutions. (Arslantaş, 2012) 
With the corporate governance applications it is possible to give confidence 
both of domestic and foreign investors. In other words, it is possible to provide 
capital inflow. On the other part, it is important to quality of management from the 
lenders' perception. The risk premium will be reduced at the rate of reliability of the 
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company. The financial resource that has been best cost effective for the company 
is the fund obtained from the sale of the shares in the stock exchange. Becoming 
charming, this situation is possible providing that the value of share reflect the value 
of the company. (Ararat, 2011) 
1.1.3. The Theoretical Basis of Corporate Governance 
1.1.3.1. Agency Theory 
 
Discussion of the conflict of interests between managers and shareholder 
has been gone back to Adam Smith who has foreseen that there will be potential 
conflicts of interests when the ownership and control has not been compatible with 
each other. In the book, The Wealth of Nations published in 1776, Adam Smith 
refers to this situation with the following words: “Being the managers rather of 
other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own.” (Smith, 1776) 
As pointed out in the Roger Martin’s article (2010) modern capitalism has 
two fundamental periods: managerial capitalism and shareholder value capitalism. 
Managerial capitalism when has begun in 1932, it brought a radical approach 
regarding professional executives to take part in the business. The second, 
shareholder value capitalism, has begun in 1976 and stated that the purpose of the 
corporations had been to maximize the wealth of the shareholders and if the 
corporations chase this goal, both of shareholders and society will benefit. (Martin, 
2010) Then in 1976, managerial capitalism had been in the line of fire: Michael C. 
Jensen and William H. Meckling’s article “Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, published in the JFE. In this 
work, which has become the most-cited academic business work of ever, it has been 
declared that owners had been tired of professional managers, who increased their 
own financial wealth rather than that of the shareholders. It has been mentioned in 
the article that it has been bad for shareholders and destructive for the economy. In 
the meantime, Jensen and Meckling had argued that the managers had been 
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spending extravagantly corporate and social resources to feather their own nests. 
(Martin, 2010) 
According to Laiho (2011), agency theory have a place as a central role in 
the literature regarding corporate governance. It has been stated that corporate 
governance describes the main conflict between managers which have been self-
interested and shareholders. 
According to agency theory, it has been regarded that the managers in the 
joint stock companies get further away from the purpose of maximizing the 
shareholder value. (Arslantaş, 2012) As a result, a conflict of interest has been 
appeared between managers and shareholders regarding the conflict.  While the aim 
of shareholders’ to maximize the profit, the expectations of the managers has been 
to have higher wage and utility maximizing. This differentiation has been emerged 
as a principal – agent problem. 
1.1.3.2. Stakeholder Theory 
 
While focusing on issues such as how to manage businesses efficient and 
productive, identification of deficiencies administratively and how these 
deficiencies can be solved, the concepts of shareholder, employee and stakeholder 
has been appeared. 
According to Erişmiş (2013), stakeholders as a group or person who affect 
the reach of corporations’ goals or affected by reach of the corporations. 
Furthermore, stakeholder has been defined in the Communique on Corporate 
Governance by CBM: “Stakeholders are persons, institutions or interest groups that 
are related with the achievement of goals or activities of the corporation such as 
employees, creditors, clients, suppliers, syndicates, several non-profit 
organizations. The corporation in its transactions and activities shall protect the 
rights of the stakeholders which have been regulated in legislation and reciprocal 
contracts.” (CBM, 2014) 
Clarke (1998) emphasises that stakeholders have expectations from the 
corporations and summarized these requests in a table. 
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Table 1.1: Expectations of Stakeholders 
 
Partners Expectations of Stakeholders Information Supplied by 
Organisations 
Employees Remuneration, job security, training  Company reports,  employment news, 
negotiations 
Shareholders Dividends and increased share price Annual reports and accounts, 
information on mergers and takeovers 
Customers Quality, service, security, value for 
money 
Advertising, documentation, surveys 
Banks Company liquidity and solvency, 
value of guarantees, cash flow 
generation 
Coverage ratios, security, cash flow 
forecast 
Suppliers Stable and lasting relationship Prompt payment 
State Respect for laws, employment, 
competitiveness, and reliable data 
Reports to official bodies, press 
releases  
Public Operational security, contribution to 
the community 
Security reports, bulletins 
Environment Substitution of unsustainable 
resources and non-polluting activities 
Environmental reports, conformance 
reports 
Source: (Blondel, Joffre, Planchais, & Simon, 2012) 
 
With this approach, it has been seen that corporations has been no longer 
the structures that meets the needs of society by serving goods and services. It has 
been defined by Donaldson and Preston (1995) that the corporations has been the 
system which have lots of participant and related parties and each of parties receive 
a return regarding their contributions to the corporations. 
Companies will be in the heart of the system as an agent by providing 
interchanges in terms of information, product, service, talent and other resources in 
this stakeholder network and they will be able to optimize both their expectations 
of stakeholders and their own wealth with win-win approach. (Walsh, 2005) 
According to Umanto and Atmoko (2015) corporate governance is a form 
of relations and process that implemented by a company to create surplus value to 
the shareholders in a long term and sustainable way while being attentive to the 
interests of all stakeholders in relation to existing regulations. 
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1.1.3.3. Institutional Theory 
 
We can say that the structure and behaviour of companies have been 
influenced by the institutional pressures, expectations and beliefs.  
As stated in the work of Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), the 
mechanism of auditing that comes from outside of the company serves as the 
mechanism to secure that the management will behave in accordance with existing 
regulations and procedures in order to achieve the company goals. (Umanto & 
Atmoko, 2015) 
The work of Apaydın (2009) states that regulatory authorities have been 
first environmental element that force to corporations to become institutionalization 
and regulatory authorities have forced the corporations to act in certain forms. The 
corporations respond to demands of these authorities with legitimacy concern. 
Unless the companies have been in compliance with this regulations, they will be 
subject to the direct or indirect enforcements. The norms which created by this 
regulatory authorities have been function as a control mechanism. 
According to Greenwood and Hinings (1996), reaction of the companies 
will be dependent on the internal dynamics of each company despite the pressure 
from the corporate area and / or market. In addition to this, the behaviours of the 
companies will be changed depend on the cause of pressure, the identity of the 
regulatory, the type of pressure. (Oliver, 1991) 
Within this context, the principles, codes and recommendations which have 
been brought under the name of corporate governance mean that companies have 
been included new elements in the corporate environment to the corporations. 
1.1.3.4. Resource Dependence Theory 
Based on the studies leading to the formation of the theory, we can state 
how resources are important in concern with sustaining the activities of the 
company.  
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According to Arslantaş (2012), the companies have not been fully self-
sufficient. Companies have to take support from the environment in order to reach 
the resources which needed for continuation of life. The uncertainty in this external 
environment and causing an addiction of the relationship for the resource 
procurement has been made the environment important. In other words, the degree 
of dependence on the resources that companies need constitute a basis of resource 
dependence theory.   
1.2. OCCURRENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURES 
 
It can be said that the need for standards to improve the management of the 
company has been occurred for the first time in the US in the 1970s as a result of 
the Watergate scandal and the related corruptions. It has been seen that corporate 
governance had been come to existence in the United States with the purpose of 
ensuring strengthening the financial control against the corruptions. (Arslantaş, 
2012) 
Following the adverse events in the United States in early 1980's, it has been 
seen that qualification of the management had been generated a discussion in 
England. After the corporate scandals (Polly Peck, British & Commonwealth, etc.), 
England had been started to perform studies which had been formed a basis of 
corporate governance. 
In this section, the reasons of the occurrence of corporate governance has 
been listed with headings. 
1.2.1. Crisis 
 
Subsequently the Asian financial crisis, which started in the middle of 1997, 
corporate governance has been at the center of the reforms oriented with making to 
develop the capital markets, defending the investors' rights, increasing the capital 
flow to the emerging markets. These reforms had focused on measures and rules 
for preventative savings which would have a negative impact on company's value. 
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At the center of the reforms in this period, was the maximization of shareholder 
value and the protection of the rights of the minority shareholders. The global crisis 
which began in 2008 had brought the topic of access to financial capital in other 
words corporate governance to the agenda of the regulators and has paved the way 
for the new laws and regulations both in the U.S. and in the European Union. This 
time, however, in the center of reforms was not the maximization of the share value, 
which had lost reputation, but rather the long-term value creation of the companies, 
their contribution to economic development and social welfare. (Ararat & Yurtoğlu, 
2012) 
As a natural consequence of this, the importance of the corporate 
governance has been gradually increased due to the financial crisis which becoming 
frequent in the last quarter of a century. 
1.2.2. Globalisation 
 
As a result of globalization, becoming easier to reach to the information 
regarding corporations which have been significant actors in the international 
economies and being strong of the corporate structures of these corporations has 
been made the companies preferable and investable from the point of investors. 
As emphasized in the work of Ararat (2011), management of the joint stock 
company which traded has become a topic which has been in the spotlight in 
countries where the shareholders have been common and pension funds take a part 
in the shareholder structures. For some industries, globalization has been 
prerequisite for the profitability. Investment capital has also have a free movement. 
Ararat also states that the countries have to develop their capital policies with  
competitive approach. Due to the fact that the developing countries have a trouble 
when they lose the trust of investors, it should be necessary to attract and encourage 
the permanent capital, the long-term capital. 
Analysing of post investment and return has been come into prominence in 
respect to transfer of funds from country to other country. The most important factor 
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that specifies the risk in respect of investors has been management system and 
regulations in the country in where will be invested. One of the most fundamental 
requirements for providing the conditions which requested by investors has been 
corporate governance applications. 
1.2.3. Privatization Wave 
 
Since 1980s, privatization practices which have become prevalent, have 
been indirectly influential on taking on a new meaning for corporate governance. 
After the state owned companies passing into the private ownership, have being 
canalized into the capital markets of the companies with the aim of funding a capital 
and starting of merger & acquisition activities has made a contribution to the 
importance of corporate governance principles. In order for the privatization 
activities to have a positive effect on economic growth, individuals which invested 
in privatized companies should know that their money will be evaluated by the 
managers of the institution in a reliable way. Therefore, funding of privatized 
companies is only possible with good corporate governance. (Keküllüoğlu, 2008) 
The contribution of privatization to the economy has been possible with 
belief of investors to the management. In this regard, private investments need good 
corporate governance. 
1.2.4. Corporate Scandals 
 
“Some people call me on bad apple, Well I may be bruised but I still taste 
sweet. Some people call me on bad apple, But I may be the sweetest apple on the 
tree.” David Wilcox 
In the Achbar's work (2003), the documentary has begun with scandals 
which have been triggered a wide discussion about the lack of public control or big 
corporations. The President Bush claims that over the market of distrust, 95% of 
the business community have been honest, have uncovered all their assets, and are 
balanced despite being some bad apples. And the movie pointed out that better 
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media discussion about the base of operating rules of the corporate world was 
leapingly turned into a game: follow the leader.  
Especially after the scandals, the media has begun to make propaganda 
regarding that USA has been still the most reliable investment area despite the 
becoming reality of scandals. Unfortunately, Increasing of the companies, which 
are called bad apples, has caused the fruit basket to be filled. 
In the documentary, it has been mentioned that it has been the worst crisis 
of confidence in business, and also it has been emphasized that the corporations 
have been as a paradox institution that creates huge wealth but conduce to grand 
and often hidden damages.  
In the work of Henle (2006), it has been asked this simple question: “Are 
recent corporate scandals a case of a few unethical business leaders (bad apples) 
or the general corporate culture and reward systems (bad barrels)? Is it the person 
or the situation?” 
The opinion of mismanagement which has been considered one of the 
important reasons behind the scandals of corporations like Enron, WorldCom, 
Xerox in the U.S., Parmalat (Italy), Ahold (Netherlands) in European Union, 
Yangguangxia in China has brought the concept of good management which means 
corporate governance into the forefront. (Arslantaş, 2012) 
1.2.5. Debt and Equity Transactions 
 
To be able to reach the goals, the corporations have to find the financial 
resources: debt or equity. In this circumstances, it has been of capital importance 
that the quality of management of the company from the point of the investors. In 
addition to this, the corporations have two options to be able to growth: organic and 
inorganic growth. 
It has been pointed out in the work of Liu and Wang (2013) that mergers 
and acquisitions, which have been seen as growth strategies, have attracted the 
attention from developed economies along with emerging economies. The global 
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transactions of M&A opened a road to new record both in quantity and in scale in 
the 21st century. To be more precise, the M&A activity has become a notable way 
to search after resources and development. Liu and Wang (2013) also puts a 
question: “M&A, however, can really make a profit for the enterprise, or increase 
the shareholder’s wealth?” 
According to Uğur (2010), the well-conducted company has a value when 
it sold. It has been emerged that to keep value higher means more than a cash flow 
relationship, to increase the value has provide a benefit to the company before the 
acquisition. In other respects, if the competitive advantage for the companies is 
important, it has been well understood that corporate governance is an element 
which increase the value. 
Research of Lips (2016) indicates that implementing the governance 
mechanisms to the companies could help to solve the problem regarding the 
negative impact of M&A’s on financial performance of the companies. 
1.3. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
 
The work of Deloitte (2006) states that considering all interest relationship 
regarding shareholders and whole stakeholders’ expectations, the management of a 
company should make an effort  about the company’s sustainable desired 
performance level and make satisfied all stakeholders in a balance. The 
management should focus on the principles regarding corporate governance to be 
able to reach to resources which is needed by the company.  
These four basic principles of corporate governance has been associated 
with performance measurement and its development and in the meanwhile it has 
been expected to work in harmony with the social value. 
Transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility has been regarded 
as the principles of the corporate governance approaches in the world which have 
been generally accepted. 
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Capital Markets Board of Turkey has framed the Principles of corporate 
governance as follows: “The Principles mainly address publicly held joint stock 
companies. However, it is considered that other joint stock companies and 
institutions, active in private and public sector, may also implement these 
Principles. The implementation of the Principles is optional.” (CBM, 2003) 
1.3.1. Transparency 
 
It has been a considerable amount of information as mandatory and 
voluntary in many countries, and this information have been compiled for publicly 
traded or private companies and in the sequel these information have been 
published to a broad range of users.  
As set forth by OECD (2015), transparency, which can be defined as public 
disclosure, has been required on an annual basis at a minimum. The work of OECD 
also states that public disclosure has been an obligation on a semi-annual or 
quarterly basis, or even higher in case of material effects either adverse or 
favourable on the company. It should not be forgotten that voluntary disclosures 
have been made by the companies beyond mandatory disclosure requirements in 
response to market demand. 
CBM shows an informative approach to transparency by indicating that the 
intent of public disclosure and transparency is to deliver information to the 
shareholders and investors which has been accurate, complete, understandable, 
easy-to analyse and also achievable with following statement. The informative 
approach to the companies has been expressed with the following words: "While 
disclosing information, the company is recommended to use most basic concepts 
and terminology and avoid using vague or indefinite expressions that would result 
in confusion. In cases when it may become absolutely essential to use technical 
terms, relevant explanations are to be provided in order to make such information 
comprehensible to everyone." (CBM, 2003) 
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In this direction, the authorities have fixed the rules oriented to transparency 
for the companies that have to create the information policy to disclosure to the 
public and standardize the information for the financial statements and other 
information.  
1.3.2. Accountability 
 
Accountability has been defined by CBM with these words: "Accountability 
means the obligation of the board of directors to account to the company as a 
corporate body and to the shareholders." (CBM, 2003) 
Furthermore, in the work of OECD (2015)  the principle accountability has 
been detailed by expressing that it has been required the continuous review of 
company’s internal structure in order to ensure there has been a frame regarding 
accountability. 
According to Romzek (2000), accountability has been constantly a 
challenge for the management of the company, and accountability has been 
understood as answerability for the performance of the company. (Romzek, 2000) 
1.3.3. Responsibility 
 
Responsibility has been defined by CBM (2003) that it has been compliance 
of whole operations which have been carried out on behalf the company with the 
regulation, articles of incorporation and internal directives of the company together. 
1.3.4. Fairness 
 
Fairness is an expression that to treat equally to all stakeholders of the 
management of the company. This principle refers to the protection of shareholder 
rights, including minorities and foreign partners, and the implementation of 
contracts. 
The principle of fairness has been examined by OECD based on two 
fundamental articles: i) The framework of corporate governance should protect the 
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shareholders rights and make easier this rights to be able to used ii) The framework 
should make certain of treatment equally to all shareholders including minorities 
and foreign shareholders. It should be have a chance to get enough amends or 
indemnities of the shareholders in the event of a breach. (Deloitte, 2006) 
1.4. DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
1.4.1. Major Regulations on Corporate Governance in the World 
1.4.1.1. Cadbury Report 
 
It has been seen that the first studies which will be the basis of the corporate 
governance principles to be published by OECD had been started by a committee 
which had been gathered by London Stock Exchange and conducted by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury. (Atamer, 2006) The Committee has been identified the best practice codes 
for the British companies to comply and published the “Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance” in the year 1992. As Karayel (2006) stated that the study 
which had been prepared to improve the quality of the supervision and to bring the 
force corporate governance has been called Cadbury report. 
When the Committee gathered in order to discuss the system of the 
companies regarding management and control, it has been specially dwelled upon 
the functions of reporting of the board, and upon the role of auditors. The outputs 
of the Committee's report has referred the principle of accountability of corporate 
governance. The Committee has expressed the aim of the report with the following 
words: “Our proposals do, however, seek to contribute positively to the promotion 
of good corporate governance as a whole. At the heart of the Committee’s 
recommendations is a Code of Best Practice designed to achieve the necessary high 
standards of corporate behaviour. The London Stock Exchange intend to require all 
listed companies registered in the United Kingdom, as a continuing obligation of 
listing, to state whether they are complying with the Code and to give reasons for 
any areas of non-compliance. This requirement will enable shareholders to know 
where the companies in which they have invested stand in relation to the Code. The 
obligation will be enforced in the same way as all other listing obligations. This 
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may include, in appropriate cases, the publication of a formal statement of censure.” 
(Cadbury Report, 1992) 
1.4.1.2. Greenbury Report 
 
Upon the concerns of shareholders and public regarding payment and 
compensations and benefits to the directors in the United Kingdom, the Greenbury 
Report has been prepared with the initiative of CBI in the year 1995. Greenbury 
According to Greenbury Report (1995), it has been agreed upon 5 main topics:  
accountability, full disclosure, alignment of director and interests of shareholders, 
responsibility, and improved performance of the company. 
The aim of the report which is the real name has been “Director’s 
Remuneration Report of a Study Group” to calculate and to determine the wages of 
the managers. Even the detailed provisions had been mainly prepared for big 
companies; these principles have been applicable to smaller companies. Report has 
been comprise of remuneration, disclosure and approval provisions, policy of 
remuneration, contracts of employment, and indemnity headings. 
1.4.1.3. Hampel Report 
 
A Committee has been established in respect to corporate governance in 
Britain in the year 1995. The Committee has selected the findings and the results of 
the reports which have been prepared by the committees of Cadbury and Greenbury 
as the baseline for their work and updated both reports bearing in mind that the 
problems which has been experienced in practice. The report which has been known 
as “Hampel Report” prepared by this committee and published as “Committee on 
Corporate Governance – Final Report” in the year 1998.  
In the Hampel Report (1998), it has been framed the governance approach 
with this expression: “Good governance ensures that constituencies (stakeholders) 
with a relevant interest in the company’s business are fully taken into account. In 
addition, good governance can make a significant contribution to the prevention of 
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malpractice and fraud, although it cannot prevent them absolutely.” (Hampel 
Report, 1998) 
According to report, investor protection should be paid strict attention to 
and it should be targeted to support the high standards of corporate governance. 
Furthermore, the companies listed on the stock exchange should be protected. 
(Sancar, 2015) 
1.4.1.4. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
The principles has been prepared upon the requests of the OECD Council 
which has been at the ministerial level on the 27-28 April 1998, together with 
national governments, relevant national organizations and the private sector in order 
to develop set of standards and guiding principles regarding corporate governance 
from the OECD. In line with developments in recent years, the principles have been 
revised by the OECD Steering Group regarding Corporate Governance and some 
amendments and additions have been made. (Arslantaş, 2012) 
Arslantaş (2012) emphasizes that there has been no single model of 
corporate governance. OECD has established some common components which 
underlie corporate governance. In the report, which has been prepared by OECD 
(2004), it has been expressed that this principles have been a dynamic instrument, 
which recommend non-binding standards and best practices. It has been also stated 
that the principles can be customised to specific conditions of on the basis of 
countries and regions. Due to the fact that, to be able to comply with the best 
principles, many countries have re-structured and published their legislation. 
Although the principles are not binding, it is an important guide for 
governments and companies to review their own management understanding and to 
implement the standards set. In the preface of the study, it is suggested that countries 
should prepare the codes with the principle of "one size does not fit all". (TKYD, 
2019) 
It could be summarized the OECD Principles under six main headings:  
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a) Forming the basis regarding an effective corporate governance 
framework 
b) Shareholders’ rights and key ownership functions 
c) The fairly treatment of shareholders 
d) Stakeholders’ role in corporate governance 
e) Transparency and public disclosure 
f) Board of directors’ responsibility 
2015 edition of OECD work takes in consideration account developments 
in both the corporate and financial sectors that may affect the efficiency and interest 
of corporate governance policies and applications. 
In the 2015 version of the principles, the Council has a recommendation on 
corporate governance. According to this, the Council has outlined the advices as 
follows: “i) for members and non-members: having fall in line with the 
recommendation and taking into account of the principles , ii) dissemination of the 
recommendation by secretary general, iii) dissemination the recommendation by 
parties which consisting of members and non-members, iv)  inviting non-members 
to take in consideration and abide by to the recommendation v) establishing the 
Committee regarding corporate governance in order to follow up implementing 
steps. (OECD, 2015) 
1.4.1.5. Sarbanes Oxley Act 
 
Bertus et al. (2008) state that it has been occurred the bankruptcy filings 
which break a record in the U.S. in the last past decade.  Whereas many of them 
have been occurred in relation with situation of the market, many of them regarding 
fraud. Irrespective of reasons of these insolvencies, after the scandals like Enron 
and WorldCom, it had been constituted a consensus among policymakers and 
observers of industries regarding existing applications of management and lack of 
supervision of government. 
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Especially after the financial scandals of major and well-known companies 
such as Enron, WorldCom and Xerox in the U.S., Public Company Accounting 
Reform and Investor Protection Act, in other words Sarbanes Oxley Act, has been 
signed in July 2002 for public companies with the aim of improving the controls on 
financial reporting of companies and also supporting the effective corporate 
management. (Arslantaş, 2012) 
Sarbanes Oxley Act which has been passed by Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress gathered with the 
object of protecting investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosures made in compliance with the securities laws, and for other purposes. 
(The U.S. Congress, 2002) 
As pointed out in the article of Bertus et al. (2008) apart from other 
requirements, it has been demanded by the Act that companies to have audit 
committees which have been comprised of independent directors and financial 
officers in order to confirm that the financial statements of the companies have been 
correct. Moreover, with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act it has been created the Public 
Accounting Oversight Board with the objective to audit, standardize, investigate  
accounting firms in their roles as auditors. 
The impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been construed by Clark (2005) with 
the following words: “In the immediate aftermath of SOX, investors, businessmen, 
and government officials in other countries were sometimes inclined to shake their 
heads at the U.S. scandals and the ensuing regulation, which often struck them as 
wildly overzealous (and annoyingly costly when it purported to reach foreign 
companies doing business in or having stock listings in the U.S.). But eventually 
fraud and scandals were rediscovered to be international phenomena. After the 
outpouring of news stories about the Parmalat and Royal Dutch/Shell companies, 
corporate governance reform came to be seen as yet another example of a global 
issue.” (Clark, 2005) 
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Clark (2005) also states that the changes which has been related Sarbanes 
Oxley might be grouped under three headings: changes regarding audit, changes 
regarding board of management, and changes regarding disclosure and accounting 
rules. Furthermore, some changes had given rise to increased tasks and liabilities 
for key corporate actors. Other changes has been atmospherically relevant to the 
changes made in reply to the big scandals. 
1.4.2. Major Regulations on Corporate Governance in Turkey 
 
Discourse of corporate governance has been appeared in Turkey in early 
2000s. 
1.4.2.1. Capital Markets Board of Turkey 
 
In July 2003, The Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CBM) has published 
the principles of corporate governance for the public joint stock companies listed 
on the stock exchange on a voluntary basis. Afterwards, the principles has been 
revised in line with the changes made by OECD regarding corporate governance.  
CBM Corporate Governance Principles has been comprised of four 
sections: shareholders, public disclosure and transparency, stakeholders, and the 
board of directors. 
In the work of CMB, it has been emphasized that, the Principles has been 
established in parallel with the current practises in the world. These principles have 
been prepared as a result of contributions of all high-level bodies.  
CBM has framed the governance approach as follows: “The Principles 
mainly address publicly held joint stock companies. However, it is considered that 
other joint stock companies and institutions, active in private and public sector, may 
also implement these Principles. The implementation of the Principles is optional. 
However, the explanation concerning the implementation status of the Principles, 
if not detailed reasoning thereof, conflicts arising from inadequate implementation 
of these Principles, and explanation on whether there is a plan for change in the 
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company’s governance practices in the future should all be included in the annual 
report and disclosed to public.” (CBM, 2003) 
With these principles, it has been aimed to be able to carry on the activity at 
the international standards for all joint stock companies and develop management 
approach that will contribute to utilise easier and cheaper cost from the international 
financial resources. 
1.4.2.2. Turkish Industry & Business Association of Turkey 
 
Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) has established the 
working group regarding corporate governance in the year 1999 with the decision 
of the High Advisory Council. Furthermore, TÜSİAD has also published the OECD 
corporate governance principles by translating into Turkish in the year 2000. 
The first corporate governance practices in Turkey, has been brought into 
force by TÜSİAD with the name of "The Corporate Governance Code of Best 
Practice: Composition and Functioning of the Board of Directories" in the year 
2002 when the CMB has not published the principles yet. (Arslantaş, 2012) 
This report has been capital of importance in terms of being an effort and 
demand of business world, not a force of the state in Turkey. (Arslan, 2018) 
1.4.2.3. Corporate Governance Association of Turkey 
 
The people who prepared the report of TÜSİAD has led the drive for the 
establishment of Corporate Governance Association of Turkey (TKYD). 
TKYD, which has been established in the year 2003, is a non-profit 
organization in an effort to develop and promote loyalty to corporate governance 
principles and guidelines in Turkey. Due to the fact that, the organization defines 
its mission as leading, guiding and supporting the adaptation and implementation 
of corporate governance principles in Turkey and the region. (TKYD, 2019) 
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TKYD has been acting with the aim of being the point of reference for all 
those seeking guidance on corporate governance. 
In order to create awareness regarding corporate governance and promote 
good practices, TKYD has prepared a project, which includes companies in the 
Index: Corporate Governance Awards. The awards has been given the companies 
in four different categories. 
It can be found below the table displaying the summary of categories of 
awarded companies for the year 2018. 
 
Table 1.2: Institutions with corporate governance awards (2018) 
 
Highest Corporate Governance Rating (publicly traded in Borsa İstanbul) 
1- Aksa Akrilik 
2- Doğuş Otomotiv 
3- TAV Havalimanları 
Highest Corporate Governance Rating (private companies) 
1- Sütaş 
Highest Corporate Governance Rating (NGO) 
1- Darüşşafaka Cemiyeti 
2- Türkiye Eğitim Gönüllüleri Vakfı 
3- Türkiye İç Denetim Enstitüsü 
Company which most increased the score 
1- AG Anadolu Holding  
Source: TKYD 
1.4.2.4. 6102: The New Turkish Commercial Code (TCC) 
 
The new Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102 which was enacted in the year 
2012 has largely eliminated the gaps in legislation regarding corporate governance, 
in particular as it includes provisions to facilitate the support of the CMB's corporate 
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governance principles and legal regulations. The new TCC has regarded corporate 
governance as the fundamental approach of the code. (Arslantaş, 2012) 
As stated in the work of Deloitte (2007), it is a reform step that the TCC 
accepts corporate governance in terms of all joint-stock companies and assures it 
with mandatory provisions. 
A new page has been opened in the Turkish economy with NTCC, which 
has been formed on the principles of corporate governance, transparency and 
reliability. 
In the work of PWC (2011), it has been stated that the New Commercial 
Law will redefine the rules regarding governance in commercial area in Turkey, 
and will help reach Turkey to the next level with a modern in terms of principles of 
governance. The work also emphasizes that adoption of principles of corporate 
governance will enhance the strength of global competitive of Turkish companies. 
1.4.2.5. Borsa Istanbul Corporate Governance Index (XKURY) 
 
Another important development, which has been exhortative for corporate 
governance in Turkey, has been the establishing of the Corporate Governance Index 
within the structure of Istanbul Stock Exchange (BIST). (Pamukçu, 2011) 
As set forth by Borsa İstanbul (2019), by establishing the BIST Corporate 
Governance Index (XKURY), it has been aimed to measure the price and 
performances of return of the companies which have been publicly traded in Borsa 
İstanbul with a governance score of minimum 7 over 10. The rating score has been 
determined by the rating agencies which have been authorized by CMB as a result 
of the evaluation of the companies’ compliance with the principles of corporate 
governance. It can be found the ratings of the companies subject to Governance 
Index in the Public Disclosure Platform (PDP). 
CBM has identified the position of the rating agencies regarding corporate 
governance with this statement: “Within the framework of the regulations to be 
enforced by the CMB, the rating institutions conducting rating of corporate 
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governance will determine the implementation status of the Principles.” (CBM, 
2003)  
It can be found below the table displaying the rating agencies licenced by 
Capital Markets Board in Turkey. 
 
Table 1.3: Corporate Governance Rating Agencies 
 
1 Saha Kurumsal Yönetim ve Derecelendirme Hizmeti A.Ş. 
2 Kobirate Uluslararası Kredi Derecelendirme ve Kurumsal Yönetim 
Hizmetleri A.Ş. 
3 JCR Avrasya Derecelendirme A.Ş. 
4 DRC Derecelendirme Hizmetleri A.Ş. 
Source: CMB 
The scores of rating show a relationship of the compliance with the 
corporate governance principles of the companies. Due to the fact that, if the score 
is close to “1” it means that the company is weak in implementing the principles. 
Along the same line, if the score is close to “10”, the company meet the 
requirements of corporate governance principles better. 
According to communiqué of CMB, corporate governance ratings has been 
comprised of five main sections which are shareholders public disclosure and 
transparency, stakeholders, board of directors and the evaluation of the overall. 
The sections evaluated by rating agencies has been summarized in the below 
table. 
Table 1.4: Sections of corporate governance rating 
 
Shareholders Public disclosure Stakeholders Board of directors 
25% 25% 15% 35% 
Source: (Saha Rating, 2019) 
 
28 
 
The compliance of corporate governance principles has been outlined by 
CMB. In this sense, the principles, which have been adopted or not adopted by the 
company are need to explained. In addition to this, it has been necessary to give 
information regarding reasons in case of not applying the principles. 
It might be seen below the requirements for each part to be included in the 
mentioned compliance report. 
For shareholders section: 
o Shareholder relations department: It is necessary to explain whether 
the department has been established or not. If it has been established, 
the manager of the department and the names of staff, main 
operations of the department, number of applications which have 
been made to the department and the responses given to investors 
have been have to explained. 
o Rights of shareholders: Companies have to explain whether there 
have been information requested by the shareholders from the 
company, and also how the request of information has been 
evaluated. Furthermore, it has been necessary to explain whether 
there has been a special auditor requested by the shareholders. 
o Shareholders’ Meeting Information: In this section it has been 
evaluated that how many meetings took place in the related period. 
It is also expected to explain that how shareholders invited to 
meetings, where and what kind of information had been available to 
the shareholders before the meetings. 
o Voting rights and minority shareholders: In this section, it has been 
expected to disclose whether there have been a privileged rights on 
voting in the articles of association of the companies. Furthermore, 
it has been necessary to disclose whether the minority shares have 
been represented in management of the company. 
o Dividend policy: In this section, it has been specified that whether 
the existence of any privileged rights on distribution of dividends in 
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the articles of association of the company. Moreover, the policy of 
dividend of the company has been disclosed to public. 
o Shares’ transfer: In this part, it has been disclosed that information 
regarding the existence of provisions which cause to restrict transfer 
of shares if available and the reasons. 
For public disclosure and transparency section; 
o Company information disclosure policy: The disclosure policy has 
been explained in this section. Furthermore, if there have been any 
information which had been not to disclosed will be explained with 
the reasons. 
o Website of the company: In this part, it has been expected from the 
company to explain whether there has been a website, the web 
address of the company, whether information mentioned in CMB 
governance principles, reasons for not having a website. 
o Annual reports of companies: In this section, it has been explained 
whether the information which has been listed in governance 
Principles included or not, and if not, what is the missing 
information in the annual reports of the company. 
o Insiders of companies: In this section, it has been explained by the 
company that whether there have been individuals which reach the 
confidential business information in the company. The company has 
provided the list of insiders by the company. 
For stakeholders section; 
o Informing stakeholders: In this section, it has been explained by the 
company that whether the stakeholders have been provided with the 
information regarding the issues related to themselves, ways they 
have been informed, and the reasons if the stakeholders have been 
not informed. 
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o Participation of the stakeholders in the management: The company 
has disclosed that kind of actions which have been taken for the 
participation of Stakeholders’ in management, and the company has 
also explained whether a model has been established regarding this 
issue in this section. 
o Human resources policy: In this section, the company has disclosed 
the main principles of the policy regarding human resources of the 
company, the name and duties and powers of the representative of 
the responsible employees. Furthermore, it has been expected the 
information from the company that whether there have been any 
complaints from employees regarding discrimination. 
o Relations with the suppliers and clients: The company discloses the 
services carried out by the company in this section. 
o Social responsibility: The company provides the information on 
activities regarding the environment, region, and the public.  
For board of directors section; 
o The structure of board of directors: It has been provided with the 
information about the composition of board of directors such as 
executive, non-executive and independent members. If the 
chairman of the board has also been the executive member of the 
board, the company has to explained the reasons. 
o Qualifications of board members: The company provides the 
information whether any training and adaptation program have 
been applied for board members according to CMB Corporate 
Governance Principles. 
o The mission, vision and strategic goals of the company: In this 
section, it will be disclosed whether board of directors has 
determined and disclosed the mission/vision of the company, 
what the mission/vision is if it has been determined. The 
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company provides the information regarding the strategic goals 
of the company and implementation process of the goals. 
o Internal control and risk management mechanism: The company 
provides the information whether internal control and risk 
management mechanism has been established by the board, and 
reasons for not establishing the mechanism. If the mechanism 
has been established, it has been expected to disclose the 
efficiency of the mechanism. 
o The number, structure of committees in the company: In this 
section, the company provides the information regarding the 
committees which have been established in the company, the 
chairman and members of the committees and their 
qualifications. Furthermore, if a board member serves on a more 
than one committee, the reason for this issue has to be explained. 
o Remuneration of the board of directors: In this part, 
compensations and wages which have been granted to the board 
members and the criteria which has been used in order to 
determine them have been disclosed by the company. In addition 
to this, the company provides the information whether any loans 
granted to the board of directors or borrowing loans from the 
executives. 
The corporate governance rating methodology of rating companies is based 
on the corporate governance principles issued by CMB. It has been worthy noting 
that, it has been necessary to disclose the information whether the principles have 
been applied by the company in the rating report. If not, the conflicts of interests 
which have been arisen from the mentioned reasons have to be explained in the 
report. 
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Corporate Governance Index started to operation on August 31, 2007 with 
the start-at value of 48,082.17. The value of the index has been 82,254.42 as of 3 
May 2019.  
The Governance Index (XKURY), which has started with five companies, 
has been comprised of 47 companies as of May 2019. 
The table below has been displaying the companies, which has been 
included in the Index. 
 
Table 1.5: Corporate Governance Index (XKURY) 
 
1 AGHOL AG Anadolu Grubu Holding A.Ş. 
2 AKSGY Akiş Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
3 AKMGY Akmerkez Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
4 AKSA Aksa Akrilik Kimya Sanayii A.Ş. 
5 ALBRK Albaraka Türk Katılım Bankası A.Ş. 
6 ANSGR Anadolu Anonim Türk Sigorta Şirketi 
7 AEFES Anadolu Efes Biracılık ve Malt Sanayii A.Ş. 
8 ARCLK Arçelik A.Ş. 
9 ASELS Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
10 AYGAZ Aygaz A.Ş. 
11 CCOLA Coca-Cola İçecek A.Ş. 
12 CRDFA Creditwest Faktoring A.Ş. 
13 DOHOL Doğan Şirketler Grubu Holding A.Ş. 
14 DGGYO Doğuş Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
15 DOAS Doğuş Otomotiv Servis ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
16 ENKAI Enka İnşaat ve Sanayi A.Ş. 
17 EREGL Ereğli Demir ve Çelik Fabrikaları T.A.Ş. 
18 GARFA Garanti Faktoring A.Ş. 
19 GRNYO Garanti Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
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20 GLYHO Global Yatırım Holding A.Ş. 
21 HLGYO Halk Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
22 HURGZ Hürriyet Gazetecilik ve Matbaacılık A.Ş. 
23 IHEVA İhlas Ev Aletleri İmalat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
24 IHLAS İhlas Holding A.Ş. 
25 LOGO Logo Yazılım Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
26 MGROS Migros Ticaret A.Ş. 
27 OTKAR Otokar Otomotiv ve Savunma Sanayi A.Ş. 
28 PRKME Park Elektrik Üretim ve Madencilik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
29 PGSUS Pegasus Hava Taşımacılığı A.Ş. 
30 PETUN Pınar Entegre Et ve Un Sanayii A.Ş. 
31 PINSU Pınar Su ve İçecek Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
32 PNSUT Pınar Süt Mamülleri Sanayii A.Ş. 
33 SKBNK Şekerbank T.A.Ş. 
34 TATGD Tat Gıda Sanayi A.Ş. 
35 TAVHL Tav Havalimanları Holding A.Ş. 
36 TOASO Tofaş Türk Otomobil Fabrikası A.Ş. 
37 TRCAS Turcas Petrol A.Ş. 
38 TUPRS Tüpraş – Türkiye Petrol Rafineleri A.Ş. 
39 PRKAB Türk Prysmian Kablo ve Sistemleri A.Ş. 
40 TTKOM Türk Telekominikasyon A.Ş. 
41 TTRAK  Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makineleri A.Ş. 
42 GARAN Türkiye Garanti Bankası A.Ş. 
43 HALKB Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş. 
44 TSKB Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş. 
45 SISE Türkiye Şişe ve Cam Fabrikaları A.Ş. 
46 VESTL Vestel Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
47 YKBNK Yapı ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş. 
Source: www.kap.org.tr 
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It might be regarded as the corporate governance rating has been qualitative 
activity that has been evaluation of the quality of management considering the 
stakeholders’ rights. Corporate governance rating has been supporting taking right 
decision of the investors and reaching the necessary and correct information about 
the companies. (Arslan, 2018) 
2. SECOND CHAPTER 
2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Studies regarding corporate governance have increased in the last quarter of 
the century. The studies, which has been prepared with the aim of analysing the 
relationship of corporate governance applications and firm performance or stock 
performance, have different results. The main reason for this the corporate 
governance applications varying from country to country in related to market 
conditions.  
In this chapter, it has been touched on the studies regarding corporate 
governance in national and the international area. 
2.1.1. Corporate Governance Studies in the International Area 
 
In the work of Drobetz et al. (2003), it has been analysed that whether has 
been a relationship between the corporate governance rating and company value in 
Germany. The result of this study shows that there has been a positive relationship 
between the rating score and company value. It has been determined that having a 
higher rating score could be investment strategy that investing in high scored firms 
and shorting low scored firms would enable to earn abnormal returns of around 12 
percent on an annual basis. 
The work of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) analyse the relationship 
between shareholders right and firm value. To be able to analyse this, they had 
formed a governance index by using the incidence of 24 rules of corporate 
governance regarding 1500 firms in the year 1990s. The result of this study support 
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that companies with shareholder rights, which have been stronger, have higher 
company value and higher financial performances. 
 Bauer et al. (2003) analyse impact of good corporate governance on 
common stock returns and firm value in Europe by using Deminor Corporate 
Governance Ratings for companies FTSE Eurotop 300. Based on the approach of 
Gompers and et al. (2003), it has been formed a portfolios consisting of well-
governed and notwell-governed companies.  The results show that there has been a 
negative relationship between corporate governance and valuation. 
For the Canadian market, Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005) analyse the 
relationship between newly-released index of corporate governance and firm value, 
as quantified by Tobin’s q. For this study, it has been built a sample with 263 
Canadian firms. The results show that governance has been important in Canada 
despite the fact that there has been no evidence that governance index affects 
company value.  
The work of Ammann et al. (2010) investigate the relationship between firm 
value and firm-level corporate governance. Throughout, in this study it has been 
used a large dataset which includes 22 developed countries for the period starting 
from 2003 to 2007 from Governance Metrics International. The relationship has 
been analysed by constructing two alternative additional governance indices with 
equal weights and one index arisen from a main constituent analysis. The results 
show a strong positive relation between firm-level governance and valuation. The 
results show a strong positive relation between firm-level governance and 
valuation. 
For the Pakistani market, the work of Bhat et al. (2018) examines that how 
instruments of corporate governance affect firm value in Pakistan. By using state 
and non-state owned companies it has been analysed whether the impact on 
corporate governance on firm valuation with having different nature of ownership. 
Their results clearly demonstrate that independence board has a positive 
relationship with firm valuation for only state owned companies. 
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Brown and Caylor (2005) concludes that seven provision related to 
corporate governance fully drives the relation between governance score and firm 
value. In this study, they create a Gov-Score, a summary governance measure both 
internal and external governance and demonstrate that there has been a relationship 
governance score and firm valuation. 
Aggarwal (2013), investigate that whether corporate governance practices 
affects company's performance regarding 20 companies within the S&P CNX Nifty 
50 Index for the period starting from the year 2010 to year 2012. It has been 
concluded that the corporate governance practices have a positive impact on the 
firm performance. 
2.1.2. Corporate Governance Studies in Turkey 
 
Otluoğlu et al. (2016) evaluate what role board diversity should impact on 
financial performance. By investigating Turkish market, they have used the sample 
consist of the companies listed on Borsa İstanbul (BIST) 100 Index. In this study, 
the results indicates that female board membership affects the ROE and Tobin's q. 
The purpose of the work of Yenice and Dölen (2013) is to measure whether 
governance rating affects market value of the companies, which have been listed in 
governance index in Turkey. To be able to analyse the effect, they use the rating 
scores of the companies for the period starting from 2007 to 2011. Comparing the 
stock prices of the companies between 30 days prior and 30 days after the disclosure 
date of the scores, it has been proved that there has been a significant relation 
between scores and market values. 
Kula and Baykut (2014) practiced the effect of the corporate governance 
scores on market values of companies by cross-section regression analysis of 47 
companies in the governance index. The study has been enriched by profitability 
performance, total equity and sectoral breakdown. The results support the 
hypothesis that well-governed companies have higher market valuation and better 
financial performance. 
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The research has been conducted by Ararat et al. (2017) presents empirical 
evidence on aims at the effect of corporate governance on firm value and 
profitability. By building a Governance Index which comprised of subindices in 
terms of board structure, board procedure, board procedure, disclosure, ownership 
and shareholder rights, it has been analyzed the impact of governance applications 
on share value. The study demonstrates that well-governed applications at firm-
level positively affect the share prices of the companies. 
In the work of Sakarya (2011), the relationship between the annoucement 
of the rating score of the companies, which traded in XKURY Index, and their stock 
returns are examined for the year 2009. Within the scope, it has been used event 
study method and examined 11 companies which has been traded for the first time 
in the XKURY Index. As a result of the study, it has been determined that there 
have been a strong positive relationship between the annoucement of rating score 
and stock returns. 
Yavuz et al. (2014) analysed the occurrence of the abnormal stock returns 
of the companies, which have been included for the first time in XKURY Index for 
the years 2012 and 2013. In the direction of this scope, it has been used the stock 
returns at the date of Index entry and 10 days after of entry date. To be able to 
observe the abnormal stock returns, it has been developed various hypotheses and 
examined with event study method. According to results of the study, there has not 
been statistically significant. Some days it has been observed a negative trend, some 
days positive. 
3. THIRD CHAPTER 
 
The aim of this study is to examine the impacts of corporate governance 
applications on share prices and hence on company value. Having regard to the 
studies in literature, it has been aimed to contribute to the academic studies with the 
quantative and econometric analysis. In accordance with this purpose, the model of 
the research and method of the analysis have been explained in the following 
sections. 
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3.1. DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
 
In order to analyse the impact of corporate governance on company 
valuation in this study, it will be used the financial data of the public joint stock 
companies which have been traded in Borsa İstanbul starting from the year 2016 to 
the year 2018. Due to being possible to reach the financial data of the publicly 
traded joint stock company, the study covers only companies, which have been 
publicly traded in financial markets of Turkey. To be able to measure of this 
governance effect on the company, it will be compared two group as the companies, 
which have been traded in Borsa İstanbul and subject to BIST Corporate 
Governance Index within Borsa İstanbul, and the companies which have been 
traded in BIST100 Index. The comparison level has been determined among the 
companies that have corporate governance score and have no corporate governance 
rating and have not met these requirements in BIST100 for the last three years. 
The companies to be used in this study has been displayed in the following 
tables. 
 
Table 3.1: BIST100 Companies Subject to BIST Governance Index 
 
  BIST Governance Index 2016 2017 2018 
1 Aksa Akrilik Kimya Sanayi A.Ş. 95.98 96.32 97.02 
2 Anadolu Efes Biracılık ve Malt Sanayii A.Ş. 95.77 95.77 95.83 
3 Arçelik A.Ş. 95.23 95.23 95.35 
4 Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 91.51 92.04 92.04 
5 Coca Cola İçecek Sanayi A.Ş. 94.48 94.52 94.52 
6 Doğan Şirketler Grubu Holding A.Ş. 93.98 94.06 94.18 
7 Doğuş Otomotive Servis ve Ticaret A.Ş. 94.20 96.30 96.41 
8 Enka İnşaat ve Sanayi A:Ş. 91.75 91.79 91.80 
9 Ereğli Demir ve Çelik Fabrikaları T.A.Ş. 90.20 92.20 92.70 
10 Migros Ticaret A.Ş. 95.01 95.77 95.81 
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 BIST Governance Index 2016 2017 2018 
11 Otokar Otomotiv ve Savunma San ve Tic. A.Ş. 93.19 93.32 91.03 
12 Park Elektrik Üretim Madencilik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 90.79 90.79 90.01 
13 Pegasus Hava Taşımacılığı A.Ş. 91.70 92.50 94.00 
14 TAV Havalimanları Holding A.Ş. 95.38 96.17 96.25 
15 TOFAŞ Türk Otomobil Fabrikası A.Ş. 91.38 91.48 92.04 
16 Tüpraş -  Türkiye Petrol Rafinerileri A.Ş. 94.15 94.67 94.81 
17 Türk Telekominikasyon A.Ş. 90.24 91.75 92.87 
18 Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makineleri A.Ş. 91.49 92.13 92.16 
19 Türkiye Şişe ve Cam Fabrikaları A.Ş. 94.41 94.83 95.28 
20 Vestel Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 93.60 94.86 95.50 
21 AG Anadolu Grubu Holding A.Ş. 91.88 92.01 95.28 
22 Akiş Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 94.39 94.90 95.36 
23 Akmerkez Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 92.24 93.74 93.74 
24 Anadolu Anonim Türk Sigorta Şirketi 93.00 93.00 95.11 
25 Aygaz A.Ş. 93.61 93.64 93.99 
26 Creditwest Faktoring A.Ş. 84.46 85.26 86.04 
27 Doğuş Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 89.25 91.70 92.80 
28 Garanti Faktoring A.Ş. 92.60 93.21 93.90 
29 Garanti Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 94.00 94.30 94.50 
30 Global Yatırım Holding A.Ş. 89.90 90.52 90.60 
31 Halk gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş.   92.35 92.74 
32 Hürriyet Gazetecilik ve Matbaacılık A.Ş. 92.79 91.27 92.67 
33 İhlas Ev Aletleri İmalat Sanayi ve ticaret A.Ş. 80.82 81.99 83.75 
34 İhlas Holding A.Ş. 80.46 81.45 83.32 
35 Logo Yazılım Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 91.24 90.83 91.14 
36 Pınar Entegre Et ve Un Sanayii A.Ş. 92.64 92.88 93.09 
37 Pınar Su Sanayi  ve Ticaret  A.Ş. 93.80 94.60 95.00 
38 Pınar Süt Mamülleri Sanayii A.Ş. 92.37 92.62 92.71 
39 TAT Gıda Sanayi A.Ş.   90.78 93.08 
40 Turcas Petrol A.Ş. 93.50 94.86 95.70 
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 BIST Governance Index 2016 2017 2018 
41 Türk Prysmian Kablo ve Sistemleri A.Ş. 90.92 91.13 91.76 
Source: www.kap.org.tr/tr/endeksler 
 
Table 3.2: BIST100 Companies Having No Governance Score 
 
BIST100 Companies 
1 Afyon Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 
2 Aksa Enerji Üretim A.Ş. 
3 Alarko Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
4 Alarko Holding A.Ş. 
5 Anadolu Cam Sanayii A.Ş. 
6 Beşiktaş Futbol Yatırımları Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
7 Bim Birleşik Mağazalar A.Ş. 
8 Deva Holding A.Ş. 
9 Ege Endüstri ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
10 EİS Eczacıbaşı İlaç, Sınai ve Finansal Yatırımlar Sanayi ve Ticaret  A.Ş. 
11 Emlak Konut Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
12 Fenerbahçe Futbol A.Ş. 
13 Ford Otomotiv A.Ş. 
14 Galatasaray Sportif Sınai ve Ticari Yatırımlar A.Ş. 
15 Goodyear Lastikleri T.A.Ş. 
16 Göltaş Göller Bölgesi Çimento Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
17 Gözde Girişim Sermayesi Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
18 GSD Holding A.Ş. 
19 Gübre Fabrikaları A.Ş. 
20 Hacı Ömer Sabancı Holding A.Ş. 
21 İpek Doğal Enerji Kaynakları Araştırma ve Üretim A.Ş. 
22 İş Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
23 İttifak Holding A.Ş. 
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BIST100 Companies 
24 Kardemir Karabük Demir Çelik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
25 Karsan Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
26 Kartonsan Karton Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
27 Koç Holding A.Ş. 
28 Kordsa Teknik Tekstil A.Ş. 
29 Koza Altın İşletmeleri A.Ş. 
30 Koza Anadolu Metal Madencilik İşletmeleri A.Ş. 
31 Metro Ticari ve Mali Yatırımlar Holding A.Ş. 
32 Netaş Telekominikasyon A.Ş. 
33 ODAŞ Elektrik Üretim Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş. 
34 Petkim Petrokimya Holding A.Ş. 
35 Soda Sanayii A.Ş. 
36 Tekfen Holding A.Ş. 
37 Trakya Cam Sanayi A.Ş. 
38 TURKCELL İletişim Hizmetleri A.Ş. 
39 Tümosan Motor ve Traktör Sanayi A.Ş. 
40 Türk Hava Yolları A.O. 
41 Ülker Bisküvi Sanayi A.Ş. 
42 Zorlu Enerji Elektrik Üretim A.Ş. 
Source: www.kap.org.tr/tr/endeksler 
 
As explained in the previous section in this study, there have been 47 
companies in Governance Index as of May 2019. It should be noted that there have 
been 100 companies in the BIST100 Index. Nevertheless, as required by the 
legislation by the management of Borsa İstanbul there have been constituent 
changes in the BIST100 Index on a quarterly basis. The shares of the companies 
have been add or removed by the management of Borsa İstanbul on a quarterly 
basis.  
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Since the study covers the period starting from the year 2016 to the year 
2018, it has been determined that there have been 83 companies which permanently 
traded in BIST100 Index within this scope. It should be noted that the companies 
which had been included in BIST100 or excluded from BIST100 Index in any three-
months period, have been eliminated due to the study period starting from the year 
2016 to the year 2018. Furthermore, it has been observed that there have been 41 
companies both in BIST100 Index and subject to XKURY during the period of 2016 
to 2018. Also, it has been observed that there have been 42 companies only traded 
in BIST100 Index and have not governance score. Owing to the fact that, it has been 
a three-year research, the data to be used in the analysis of 83 companies will form 
a 249 sample size. It should be emphasized that the banks have been left it out of 
the scope. The data of the companies in the sample have been obtained from 
Bloomberg financial database, which covers the financials of whole publicly traded 
companies, and annual report of the companies. 
As pointed out in the work of Vafaei et. al (2015), accounting-based, 
market-based and cash-based criterias can be used to measure the firm performance. 
Considering the literature, it has been conceived that accounting-based, market-
based and cash-based criterias can be used as value indicators. In this regard, it has 
been used three dependent variables in order to measure the effects of corporate 
governance on company valuation from the point of accounting-based, market-
based and cash-based value criterions. 
The return on equity (ROE) which has been regarded as accounting-based 
measure has been the criteria predicated on the past performance of the company. 
ROE demonstrates the returns get of the shareholders against the capital invested. 
Tobin’s q (Q) which has been regarded as market-based measure, it has been 
demonstrated the company’s current and potential performance Haslam et al. 
(2010), it can be expressed as the replacement cost of assets of the company. As 
another measure of value indicator, the cash flow (CF) shows the performance of 
the company on the basis of cash, not accrual basis of accounting. 
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The dependent and independent variables, which have been decided to be 
included in to the analysis, have been shown in the tables below. 
 
Table 3.3: Dependent Variables of the Study 
 
Model 1 Tobin’s q (Q) 
𝑄 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Model 2 Return on Equity (ROE) 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
Model 3 Cash Flow (CF) 
𝐶𝐹 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
Table 3.4: Independent Variables of the Study 
 
Governance Score (GOV) GOV = Having corporate governance score 
Leverage Ratio (LEV) 𝐿𝐸𝑉 = 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦⁄  
Company Size (LNSIZ) LNSIZ = Natural logarithm of total assets 
EBITDA Capex Ratio (EBTCPX) 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑋 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥⁄  
Risk of Stock Movements (VAR) VAR = Variance of third year share price 
Change of Sales (GR) 
𝐺𝑅 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 ∗ (𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑)
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
 
Governance score (GOV), one of the independent variables which have 
been considered to have impact on the company valuation has been included in 
three models as a dummy variable. It should be noted that the company valuation 
has not only been affected by governance score, it has been affected by other 
factors. Due to this reason, company size (LNSIZ), leverage of the company (LEV), 
ebitda capex ratio (EBTCPX), risk of share movements (VAR) and change of sales 
(GR) will be used as control variables in both three models.  
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The variables, which have been used in the analysis of this study, have been 
summarized as follows: 
It has been computed the dependent variables of this study as tree versions 
of the company value indicators: Tobin’s q ratio (Q), return on equity (ROE), and 
cash flow (CF). 
 
It has been defined Tobin’s q ratio (Q) in the below calculation: 
𝑄 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
It has been defined return on equity (ROE) in the below calculation: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
 
It has been defined cash flow (CF) in the below calculation: 
𝐶𝐹 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
 
Based on the consideration that the independent variables of the study, it 
has been computed the variables as follows: 
For the governance score; 
𝐺𝑂𝑉 = 𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 
It has been defined the governance score as a dummy variable that equals 
one if the company has been in the Governance Index for the study period and zero 
otherwise. 
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For the company size; 
𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍 = 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
For the leverage of the company; 
𝐿𝐸𝑉 =  𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦⁄  
 
For the ebitda capex ratio; 
𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑋 =  𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠⁄  
 
For the risk of share movements; 
𝑉𝐴𝑅 = 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 
 
For the change of sales; 
𝐺𝑅 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 ∗ (𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑)
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
 
It might be found the descriptive statistics of the companies used in the 
analysis in the table below. 
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics of the Companies 
 
The table present summary statistic for the variables, which have been used in 
the study. The sample has been covered the period starting from the year 2016 to 
the year 2018 and has 249 observations of the 83 companies. 
 
Variable N Mean Median Max. Min. Sd. Dev. 
Q 249 1.1825 1.1657 2.2568 0.5086 0.4134 
ROE 249 0.0729 0.1277 28.5967 -23.1709 2.5938 
CF 249 0.1052 0.0945 0.5210 -0.2553 0.0902 
GOV 249 0.4940 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5010 
LNSIZ 249 8.1355 8.1266 12.8258 3.5749 1.5803 
GR 249 0.5574 0.1894 59.9373 -0.9999 3.8405 
LEV 249 0.6634 0.2860 13.6763 0.0000 1.2675 
VAR 249 75.9877 1.4540 3280.7619 0.0052 378.0241 
EBTCPX 249 275.0202 2.7003 264058.56 -245026.58 23037.53 
 
Source: Bloomberg financial database & author analysis 
It can be found the table below displaying the means of the companies when 
associated governance index. 
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Table 3.6: Comparison of the Means of Companies  
 
The table present the mean comparison between the companies, which have 
governance score, and the companies having no governance score. All variables 
of the study has been tested at a 5% significance level. Since the governance 
score (GOV) has been considered having an impact on the company valuation, it 
has been build two sample group in order to measure the governance impact on 
a company value with the dependent and independent variables. 
 
Variable Mean (GOV=1) Mean (GOV=0) T – Test Stat. 
Q 1.3143 1.3450 -0.2636 
ROE 0.0170 0.1274 -0.3314 
CF 0.1023 0.1081 -0.5136 
LNSIZ 8.1073 8.1631 -0.2778 
GR 0.8146 0.3064 1.0317 
LEV 0.7714 0.5579 1.3259 
VAR 34.4613 116.5254 -0.9998 
EBTCPX 296.5535 253.9996 0.0147 
Source: Bloomberg financial database & author analysis 
As it might be seen in the table above, it could not be found a significant 
difference between the companies having governance score and having not 
governance score at a 5% significance level. 
3.2. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this study, the relationship between the corporate governance and 
company valuation has been analysed. In this sense, the methodology of the 
analysis and hypotheses developed in line with this study have been explained 
below. 
In accordance with this purpose, the following hypotheses have been 
developed for this study: 
(1) H1: Corporate governance positively affects Tobin’s q ratio    
(2) H1: Corporate governance positively affects ROE                    
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(3) H1: Corporate governance positively affects CF 
Within the scope of the study, the data set of the companies to be used in 
this analysis have been tested with panel data analysis in both of three models. 
3.3. PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
 
It has been used panel data analysis, which enable to include both cross-
sectional and temporal effects in this study. Since the panel data analysis has both 
cross-sectional data and time dimension, there has been the opportunity to be able 
to use more data and this situation will make the econometric estimates more 
effective, as it increases the degree of freedom in the estimates. (Yıldız, Yalama, & 
Sevil, 2009) 
In line with the purpose of this study, it has been established three models 
with three different dependent variables. 
 
Model 1: 
Qi,t = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1GOVi,t + 𝛽2LNSIZi,t + 𝛽3LEVi,t + 𝛽4GRi,t + 𝛽5VARi,t + 
𝛽6EBTCPXi,t + 𝜀i,t 
Model 2: 
ROEi,t = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1GOVi,t + 𝛽2LNSIZi,t + 𝛽3LEVi,t + 𝛽4GRi,t + 𝛽5VARi,t + 
𝛽6EBTCPXi,t + 𝜀i,t 
Model 3: 
CFi,t = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1GOVi,t + 𝛽2LNSIZi,t + 𝛽3LEVi,t + 𝛽4GRi,t + 𝛽5VARi,t + 
𝛽6EBTCPXi,t + 𝜀i,t 
As it might be seen in the models above, it has been build three different 
criteria as a value indicator. The structure of models have been comprised of six 
different independent variables out of which five variables have been control 
variables, whereas GOVi,t have been formed as a dummy variable. 
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3.4. EMPRICAL FINDINGS 
 
In the estimation of the coefficient, which has been made in panel data 
analysis, there have been three main methods: pooled regression, fixed effects and 
random effects. In the meantime, the most commonly analysed models are fixed 
and random effects. (Bălă & Prada, 2014) 
To be able to measure the impact of corporate governance on company 
value, the data set of each model have been analysed in the pooled regression. 
The results of pooled regression analyses have been summarized in the 
below tables. 
 
Table 3.7: The Results of Ordinary Least Squares Method 
 
The table represent the results of the ordinary least squares regression of three 
versions of the company value indicators. The sample has been covered the period 
starting from the year 2016 to the year 2018. The dependent variables are company 
value measured as Tobin's q ratio, ROE, and CF. The symbols ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and %10 levels, respectively. 
N= 249 
Model 1: Q Model 2: ROE Model 3: CF 
Coef. t-Stat. R-sq Coef. t-Stat. R-sq Coef. t-Stat. R-sq 
C 1.847 5.81*** 0.040 0.202 0.224 0.004 0.089 3.11 0.181 
GOV 8.12 0.000  -0.079 -0.236  0.000 0.028  
LNSIZ -0.066 -1.747*  -0.005 -0.005  0.002 0.485  
LEV -0.004 -0.082  -0.090 -0.672  -0.001 -0.336  
GR -0.009 -0.616  -0.000 -0.003  -0.002 -1.168  
VAR 0.000 2.263**  0.000 0.324  6.05 4.275***  
EBTCPX 1.86 0.073   2.72 0.377   1.31 5.744***   
 
As it have been displayed the table above, it has been observed that the t-
statistics value of Q, ROE and CF are 0.0001, -0.236 and 0.028 respectively. 
After performing the pooled regression method, it has been tested which 
method (fixed effects or random effects) would be more suitable with the Hausman 
test.  
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It has been worthy noting that the fixed effect method mentions about the 
change in data over the time and also examines the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. In the random effects method, inter-unit 
changes are constant and unrelated to dependent and independent variables. (Bal & 
Özdemir, 2017) The important difference between fixed effect method and random 
effect method has been whether the unit effects have been correlated with the 
independent variables.  
The results of Hausman test have been summarized in the below table. 
Table 3.8: The Result of Hausman Test 
 
The table represent the results of the Hausman test  of three versions of company 
value indicators. The sample period is from 2016 to 2018. Dependent variables 
The dependent variables are company value measured as Tobin's q ratio, ROE, 
and CF. 
Dependent Variable   Chi-sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Q  6.031613 4 0.1968 
ROE  0.288125 4 0.9906 
CF   2.089676 4 0.7193 
 
Hausman (1978) specification test has been developed in order to make a 
choice, which has been suitable among the methods in panel data analysis. It should 
not be forgotten that, it has been investigated whether Chi-Square value has been 
less than 5%.  As it might be seen in the table above, the probability of Chi-Square 
values for each dependent variable has been more than 5%, which means it has been 
needed to perform random effects method. 
The results of random effects have been summarized for each dependent 
variables in the below table. 
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Table 3.9: The Results of Random Effects Method 
The table represent the results of the random effect method of three versions of 
the company value indicators. The sample has been covered the period starting 
from the year 2016 to the year 2018. All variables have been defined in the 
previous section of the study. The impact of governance score has been tested with 
random effects method both of three models. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and %10 levels, respectively. 
N=249 
Model 1: Q Model 2: ROE Model 3: CF 
Coef. t-Stat. R-sq Coef. t-Stat. R-sq Coef. t-Stat. R-sq 
          
C 2.543 5.983 0.285 0.203 0.186 0.004 0.094 2.451 0.047 
GOV 0.002 0.011  -0.079 -0.196  0.000 -0.022  
LNSIZ -0.153 -3.103  -0.005 -0.040  0.001 0.215  
LEV 0.013 0.347  -0.091 -0.559  -0.001 -0.275  
GR 0.000 0.021  0.000 -0.002  0.000 -0.475  
VAR 0.000 1.239  0.000 0.269  0.000 2.853  
EBTCPX 0.000 0.111   0.000 0.313   0.000 9.470   
 
As it might be seen the table above, it has been observed that the t-statistics 
value of the independent variable, which has been GOV in this study, for each of 
model Q, ROE and CF are 0.011330, -0.195908 and -0.022114 respectively. Due 
to the fact that, it has been observed that there has been no significance impact of 
corporate governance on company value.  
The results of random effect method demonstrate that there has been  no 
significant impact of corporate governance on company value when considered the 
value from the point of market-based, accounting-based, and cash-based indicator. 
Therefore, it has been determined that there have been no significant governance 
impact on company value. 
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3.5. CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and company value. Within the scope of this study, it has been 
examined the company value by considering that being subject to Governance 
Index contributes positively to the company value.  
Corporate governance has been a major step forward by Turkish law with 
the new Turkish Commercial Code, which has entered into force in 2012. In this 
regard, it has been a motivating factor in order to exercise this study. 
In the first part of this study, corporate governance tried to explain 
conceptually, in the meantime the impact of corporate governance practices on 
companies have been mentioned. In this respect, the theoretical and historical 
development of corporate governance and the corporate governance principles have 
been explained. In the second part of the study, the studies which take part in 
literature have been mentioned at national and international area. In the last part of 
this study, the impact of corporate governance rating of the companies which has 
been publicly traded in Borsa İstanbul and subject to BIST Corporate Governance 
Index within Borsa İstanbul on company value have been examined by using panel 
data analysis. With using panel data analysis, the companies have been compared 
between having rating score and not having the score. 
The sample of the study has been comprised of 83 companies which have 
been publicly traded in Borsa İstanbul. In this study, the impact of corporate 
governance practices of the companies in the sample have been investigated 
empirically. Within the scope in this study, the impact of governance applications 
on company value has been examined from the point of market-based, accounting-
based and cash-based indicators, which have been used as valuation factors.  
As a result of the study, it has been observed that there has been no 
significant impact of having governance score on company valuation from the point 
of market-based, accounting-based, and cash-based value criterions.  
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From this point of view, it has been arrived at a conclusion that there has 
been no significant governance impact on the company value. 
Corporate investors generally give importance whether the company has 
been well-managed in terms of governance practices when they have do long-term 
investment and investment preferences. Therefore, corporate investors prefer the 
companies with a high governance score in their portfolio selection. 
On the other hand, it is worthy noting that individual investors have been 
the big majority of the total investors in Borsa İstanbul in comparison with the 
developed markets. Individual investors, who tend to short-term investment, have 
not decide to investment preferences in reference to governance score of the 
companies.  In spite of the fact that there have been limited domestic / foreign 
corporate investors in Turkish stock market, recognizing the well-governed 
companies by both individual and corporate investors in Turkish stock market it 
will be reflected to the investment preferences of investors. In this regard, 
promoting the corporate governance practices will enable to preferred the 
companies by the investors and so the value of the companies will be increased. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Expectations of Stakeholders 
 
Partners Expectations of 
Stakeholders 
Information Supplied by 
Organisations 
Employees Remuneration, job security, 
training  
Company reports,  
employment news, 
negotiations 
Shareholders Dividends and increased share 
price 
Annual reports and accounts, 
information on mergers and 
takeovers 
Customers Quality, service, security, 
value for money 
Advertising, documentation, 
surveys 
Banks Company liquidity and 
solvency, value of guarantees, 
cash flow generation 
Coverage ratios, security, cash 
flow forecast 
Suppliers Stable and lasting relationship Prompt payment 
State Respect for laws, 
employment, competitiveness, 
and reliable data 
Reports to official bodies, 
press releases  
Public Operational security, 
contribution to the community 
Security reports, bulletins 
Environment Substitution of unsustainable 
resources and non-polluting 
activities 
Environmental reports, 
conformance reports 
Source: (Blondel, Joffre, Planchais, & Simon, 2012) 
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Table A.2: Institutions with corporate governance awards (2018) 
 
Highest Corporate Governance Rating (publicly traded in Borsa İstanbul) 
4- Aksa Akrilik 
5- Doğuş Otomotiv 
6- TAV Havalimanları 
Highest Corporate Governance Rating (private companies) 
2- Sütaş 
Highest Corporate Governance Rating (NGO) 
4- Darüşşafaka Cemiyeti 
5- Türkiye Eğitim Gönüllüleri Vakfı 
6- Türkiye İç Denetim Enstitüsü 
Company which most increased the score 
2- AG Anadolu Holding  
Source: TKYD 
 
Table A.3: Corporate Governance Rating Agencies 
 
1 Saha Kurumsal Yönetim ve Derecelendirme Hizmeti A.Ş. 
2 Kobirate Uluslararası Kredi Derecelendirme ve Kurumsal Yönetim 
Hizmetleri A.Ş. 
3 JCR Avrasya Derecelendirme A.Ş. 
4 DRC Derecelendirme Hizmetleri A.Ş. 
Source: CMB 
 
Table A.4: Sections of corporate governance rating 
 
Shareholders Public disclosure Stakeholders Board of directors 
25% 25% 15% 35% 
Source: (Saha Rating, 2019) 
 
64 
 
 
Table A.5: Corporate Governance Index (XKURY) 
 
1 AGHOL AG Anadolu Grubu Holding A.Ş. 
2 AKSGY Akiş Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
3 AKMGY Akmerkez Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
4 AKSA Aksa Akrilik Kimya Sanayii A.Ş. 
5 ALBRK Albaraka Türk Katılım Bankası A.Ş. 
6 ANSGR Anadolu Anonim Türk Sigorta Şirketi 
7 AEFES Anadolu Efes Biracılık ve Malt Sanayii A.Ş. 
8 ARCLK Arçelik A.Ş. 
9 ASELS Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
10 AYGAZ Aygaz A.Ş. 
11 CCOLA Coca-Cola İçecek A.Ş. 
12 CRDFA Creditwest Faktoring A.Ş. 
13 DOHOL Doğan Şirketler Grubu Holding A.Ş. 
14 DGGYO Doğuş Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
15 DOAS Doğuş Otomotiv Servis ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
16 ENKAI Enka İnşaat ve Sanayi A.Ş. 
17 EREGL Ereğli Demir ve Çelik Fabrikaları T.A.Ş. 
18 GARFA Garanti Faktoring A.Ş. 
19 GRNYO Garanti Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
20 GLYHO Global Yatırım Holding A.Ş. 
21 HLGYO Halk Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
22 HURGZ Hürriyet Gazetecilik ve Matbaacılık A.Ş. 
23 IHEVA İhlas Ev Aletleri İmalat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
24 IHLAS İhlas Holding A.Ş. 
25 LOGO Logo Yazılım Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
26 MGROS Migros Ticaret A.Ş. 
27 OTKAR Otokar Otomotiv ve Savunma Sanayi A.Ş. 
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28 PRKME Park Elektrik Üretim ve Madencilik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
29 PGSUS Pegasus Hava Taşımacılığı A.Ş. 
30 PETUN Pınar Entegre Et ve Un Sanayii A.Ş. 
31 PINSU Pınar Su ve İçecek Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
32 PNSUT Pınar Süt Mamülleri Sanayii A.Ş. 
33 SKBNK Şekerbank T.A.Ş. 
34 TATGD Tat Gıda Sanayi A.Ş. 
35 TAVHL Tav Havalimanları Holding A.Ş. 
36 TOASO Tofaş Türk Otomobil Fabrikası A.Ş. 
37 TRCAS Turcas Petrol A.Ş. 
38 TUPRS Tüpraş – Türkiye Petrol Rafineleri A.Ş. 
39 PRKAB Türk Prysmian Kablo ve Sistemleri A.Ş. 
40 TTKOM Türk Telekominikasyon A.Ş. 
41 TTRAK  Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makineleri A.Ş. 
42 GARAN Türkiye Garanti Bankası A.Ş. 
43 HALKB Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş. 
44 TSKB Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş. 
45 SISE Türkiye Şişe ve Cam Fabrikaları A.Ş. 
46 VESTL Vestel Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
47 YKBNK Yapı ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş. 
Source: www.kap.org.tr 
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Table C.1: BIST100 Companies Subject to BIST Governance Index 
 
  BIST Governance Index 2016 2017 2018 
1 Aksa Akrilik Kimya Sanayi A.Ş. 95.98 96.32 97.02 
2 Anadolu Efes Biracılık ve Malt Sanayii A.Ş. 95.77 95.77 95.83 
3 Arçelik A.Ş. 95.23 95.23 95.35 
4 Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 91.51 92.04 92.04 
5 Coca Cola İçecek Sanayi A.Ş. 94.48 94.52 94.52 
6 Doğan Şirketler Grubu Holding A.Ş. 93.98 94.06 94.18 
7 Doğuş Otomotive Servis ve Ticaret A.Ş. 94.20 96.30 96.41 
8 Enka İnşaat ve Sanayi A:Ş. 91.75 91.79 91.80 
9 Ereğli Demir ve Çelik Fabrikaları T.A.Ş. 90.20 92.20 92.70 
10 Migros Ticaret A.Ş. 95.01 95.77 95.81 
11 Otokar Otomotiv ve Savunma San ve Tic. A.Ş. 93.19 93.32 91.03 
12 Park Elektrik Üretim Madencilik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 90.79 90.79 90.01 
13 Pegasus Hava Taşımacılığı A.Ş. 91.70 92.50 94.00 
14 TAV Havalimanları Holding A.Ş. 95.38 96.17 96.25 
15 TOFAŞ Türk Otomobil Fabrikası A.Ş. 91.38 91.48 92.04 
16 Tüpraş - Türkiye Petrol Rafinerileri A.Ş. 94.15 94.67 94.81 
17 Türk Telekominikasyon A.Ş. 90.24 91.75 92.87 
18 Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makineleri A.Ş. 91.49 92.13 92.16 
19 Türkiye Şişe ve Cam Fabrikaları A.Ş. 94.41 94.83 95.28 
20 Vestel Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 93.60 94.86 95.50 
21 AG Anadolu Grubu Holding A.Ş. 91.88 92.01 95.28 
22 Akiş Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 94.39 94.90 95.36 
23 Akmerkez Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 92.24 93.74 93.74 
24 Anadolu Anonim Türk Sigorta Şirketi 93.00 93.00 95.11 
25 Aygaz A.Ş. 93.61 93.64 93.99 
26 Creditwest Faktoring A.Ş. 84.46 85.26 86.04 
27 Doğuş Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 89.25 91.70 92.80 
28 Garanti Faktoring A.Ş. 92.60 93.21 93.90 
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 BIST Governance Index 2016 2017 2018 
29 Garanti Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 94.00 94.30 94.50 
30 Global Yatırım Holding A.Ş. 89.90 90.52 90.60 
31 Halk gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş.   92.35 92.74 
32 Hürriyet Gazetecilik ve Matbaacılık A.Ş. 92.79 91.27 92.67 
33 İhlas Ev Aletleri İmalat Sanayi ve ticaret A.Ş. 80.82 81.99 83.75 
34 İhlas Holding A.Ş. 80.46 81.45 83.32 
35 Logo Yazılım Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 91.24 90.83 91.14 
36 Pınar Entegre Et ve Un Sanayii A.Ş. 92.64 92.88 93.09 
37 Pınar Su Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 93.80 94.60 95.00 
38 Pınar Süt Mamülleri Sanayii A.Ş. 92.37 92.62 92.71 
39 TAT Gıda Sanayi A.Ş.   90.78 93.08 
40 Turcas Petrol A.Ş. 93.50 94.86 95.70 
41 Türk Prysmian Kablo ve Sistemleri A.Ş. 90.92 91.13 91.76 
Source: www.kap.org.tr/tr/endeksler 
 
Table C.2: BIST100 Companies Having No Governance Score 
 
BIST100 
1 Afyon Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 
2 Aksa Enerji Üretim A.Ş. 
3 Alarko Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
4 Alarko Holding A.Ş. 
5 Anadolu Cam Sanayii A.Ş. 
6 Beşiktaş Futbol Yatırımları Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
7 Bim Birleşik Mağazalar A.Ş. 
8 Deva Holding A.Ş. 
9 Ege Endüstri ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
10 EİS Eczacıbaşı İlaç, Sınai ve Finansal Yatırımlar Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
11 Emlak Konut Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
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 BIST100 
12 Fenerbahçe Futbol A.Ş. 
13 Ford Otomotiv A.Ş. 
14 Galatasaray Sportif Sınai ve Ticari Yatırımlar A.Ş. 
15 Goodyear Lastikleri T.A.Ş. 
16 Göltaş Göller Bölgesi Çimento Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
17 Gözde Girişim Sermayesi Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
18 GSD Holding A.Ş. 
19 Gübre Fabrikaları A.Ş. 
20 Hacı Ömer Sabancı Holding A.Ş. 
21 İpek Doğal Enerji Kaynakları Araştırma ve Üretim A.Ş. 
22 İş Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş. 
23 İttifak Holding A.Ş. 
24 Kardemir Karabük Demir Çelik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
25 Karsan Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
26 Kartonsan Karton Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. 
27 Koç Holding A.Ş. 
28 Kordsa Teknik Tekstil A.Ş. 
29 Koza Altın İşletmeleri A.Ş. 
30 Koza Anadolu Metal Madencilik İşletmeleri A.Ş. 
31 Metro Ticari ve Mali Yatırımlar Holding A.Ş. 
32 Netaş Telekominikasyon A.Ş. 
33 ODAŞ Elektrik Üretim Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş. 
34 Petkim Petrokimya Holding A.Ş. 
35 Soda Sanayii A.Ş. 
36 Tekfen Holding A.Ş. 
37 Trakya Cam Sanayi A.Ş. 
38 TURKCELL İletişim Hizmetleri A.Ş. 
39 Tümosan Motor ve Traktör Sanayi A.Ş. 
40 Türk Hava Yolları A.O. 
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 BIST100 
41 Ülker Bisküvi Sanayi A.Ş. 
42 Zorlu Enerji Elektrik Üretim A.Ş. 
Source: www.kap.org.tr/tr/endeksler 
 
Table C.3: Dependent variables of the study 
 
Model 1 Tobin’s q (Q) 
𝑄 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Model 2 Return on Equity (ROE) 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
Model 3 Cash Flow (CF) 
𝐶𝐹 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
Table C.4: Independent variables of the study 
 
Governance Score (GOV) GOV = Having corporate governance score 
Leverage Ratio (LEV) 𝐿𝐸𝑉 = 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦⁄  
Company Size (LNSIZ) LNSIZ = Natural logarithm of total assets 
EBITDA Capex Ratio (EBTCPX) 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐶𝑃𝑋 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥⁄  
Risk of Stock Movements (VAR) VAR = Variance of third year share price 
Change of Sales (GR) 
𝐺𝑅 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 ∗ (𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑)
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
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Table C.5: Descriptive Statistics of the Companies 
 
The table present summary statistic for the variables, which have been used in 
the study. The sample has been covered the period starting from the year 2016 to 
the year 2018 and has 249 observations of the 83 companies. 
 
Variable N Mean Median Max. Min. Sd. Dev. 
Q 249 1.1825 1.1657 2.2568 0.5086 0.4134 
ROE 249 0.0729 0.1277 28.5967 -23.1709 2.5938 
CF 249 0.1052 0.0945 0.5210 -0.2553 0.0902 
GOV 249 0.4940 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.5010 
LNSIZ 249 8.1355 8.1266 12.8258 3.5749 1.5803 
GR 249 0.5574 0.1894 59.9373 -0.9999 3.8405 
LEV 249 0.6634 0.2860 13.6763 0.0000 1.2675 
VAR 249 75.9877 1.4540 3280.7619 0.0052 378.0241 
EBTCPX 249 275.0202 2.7003 264058.56 -245026.58 23037.53 
 
Source: Bloomberg financial database & author analysis 
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Table C.6: Comparison of the Means of the Companies 
 
The table present the mean comparison between the companies, which have 
governance score, and the companies having no governance score. All variables 
of the study has been tested at a 5% significance level. Since the governance 
score (GOV) has been considered having an impact on the company valuation, it 
has been build two sample group in order to measure the governance impact on 
a company value with the dependent and independent variables. 
 
 
Variable Mean (GOV=1) Mean (GOV=0) T – Test Stat. 
Q 1.3143 1.3450 -0.2636 
ROE 0.0170 0.1274 -0.3314 
CF 0.1023 0.1081 -0.5136 
LNSIZ 8.1073 8.1631 -0.2778 
GR 0.8146 0.3064 1.0317 
LEV 0.7714 0.5579 1.3259 
VAR 34.4613 116.5254 -0.9998 
EBTCPX 296.5535 253.9996 0.0147 
Source: Bloomberg financial database & author analysis 
Table C.7: The Results of the Ordinary Least Squares Method 
 
The table represent the results of the ordinary least squares regression of three 
versions of the company value indicators. The sample has been covered the period 
starting from the year 2016 to the year 2018. The dependent variables are company 
value measured as Tobin's q ratio, ROE, and CF. The symbols ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
N= 249 
Model 1: Q Model 2: ROE Model 3: CF 
Coef. t-Stat. R-sq Coef. t-Stat. R-sq Coef. t-Stat. R-sq 
C 1.847 5.81*** 0.040 0.202 0.224 0.004 0.089 3.11 0.181 
GOV 8.12 0.000  -0.079 -0.236  0.000 0.028  
LNSIZ -0.066 -1.747*  -0.005 -0.005  0.002 0.485  
LEV -0.004 -0.082  -0.090 -0.672  -0.001 -0.336  
GR -0.009 -0.616  -0.000 -0.003  -0.002 -1.168  
VAR 0.000 2.263**  0.000 0.324  6.05 4.275***  
EBTCPX 1.86 0.073   2.72 0.377   1.31 5.744***   
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Table C.8: The Results of  Hausman Test 
 
The table represent the results of the Hausman test  of three versions of company 
value indicators. The sample period is from 2016 to 2018. Dependent variables 
have been defined in the previous sections. 
 
Dependent Variable   Chi-sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Q  6.031613 4 0.1968 
ROE  0.288125 4 0.9906 
CF   2.089676 4 0.7193 
 
Table C.9: The Results of  Random Effects Method 
 
The table represent the results of the random effect method of three versions of 
the company value indicators. The sample has been covered the period starting 
from the year 2016 to the year 2018. All variables have been defined in the 
previous section of the study. The impact of governance score has been tested with 
random effects method both of three models. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and %10 levels, respectively. 
N=249 
Model 1: Q Model 2: ROE Model 3: CF 
Coef. t-Stat. R-sq Coef. t-Stat. R-sq Coef. t-Stat. R-sq 
          
C 2.543 5.983*** 
0.28
5 
0.203 0.186 0.004 0.094 2.451** 0.047 
GOV 0.002 0.011  -0.079 -0.196  0.000 -0.022  
LNSIZ -0.153 -3.103***  -0.005 -0.040  0.001 0.215  
LEV 0.013 0.347  -0.091 -0.559  -0.001 -0.275  
GR 0.000 0.021  0.000 -0.002  0.000 -0.475  
VAR 0.000 1.239  0.000 0.269  0.000 2.853***  
EBTCPX 0.000 0.111   0.000 0.313   0.000 9.470***   
 
 
 
 
